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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
UNION SKI COMPANY
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 14065

UNION PLASTICS CORPORATION
Respondent & Defendant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for a breach of contract
which existed between the parties for the production
and marketing of a plastic ski boot.

The defendant

failed to manufacture the boots as agreed.

Plaintiff

seeks a return of payments made to Defendant and
other damages resulting from defendant's breach.
The plaintiff, Union Ski Company, a Utah corporation,
caused a summons to be served upon the defendant,
Union Plastics Corporation.

To enhance the chances

of settlement the plaintiff and the defendant entered
into a stipulation that allowed the plaintiff to
file a simple, one-page statement of the cause of

action with the right to amend the same at a later
date, and which allowed the defendant to withhold
its answer to the complaint until an answer was
demanded in writing from the plaintiff.

When settle-

ment negotiations broke down, the plaintiff demanded
that the defendant answer the complaint, and the
defendant moved the court to quash service of process
i

and to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction
over the defendant corporation,
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After the submission of briefs and affidavits
of the parties, the district court denied defendant's
motion to quash sercice of process and granted
defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The court made no finds and no basis of the
decision was stated.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff seeks this court's reversal of
that ruling dismissing the cause of action for lack
of jurisdiction and remand the matter to the district
court for trial.

-2-

STATEMENT OF PACTS
The plaintiff^ Union Ski Company, is a Utah
corporation with its sole place of business located
at Provo, Utah*

The corporation was organized by

limited stock offering to the residents of the state
of Utah*

The plaintiff was organized for the purpose

of marketing internationally a plastic ski boot
which was designed by the defendant and which was
to be manufactured by the defendant. (Tarran Affidavit
R106 Line 11)

Since the ski boot which was to be

manufactured by the defendant was plaintiff's sole
product^ and none were ever manufactured/ the plaintiff has closed its offices, discharged its personnel/and has otherwise ceased all operations
as a business.

(Jolly Affidavit R51)

The defendant/ Union Plastics Corporation/
is a corporation organized under the laws of the
State of California/ with its principal place of
business at

North Hollywood/ California.

The

said defendant is a wholly-owned subsidiary and
division of the Union Corporation/ Verona/ Pennnsylvania.

The defendant is in the business of manu-

facturing plastic products.
The plaintiff's position is that the courts
of Utah have jurisdiction over the defendant upon

several grounds: FIRST, the defendant's negotiations
in the state of Utah with the plaintiff (and its
predecessor in interest, Sports Industries, Inc.,)
in December of 1973 and January resulting in a
contract constitute a transaction of business in
the state of Utah within the meaning of Utah's "longarm" statute, section 78-27-24(1) (supp. 1969t) ;
SECOND, the defendant contracted to supply goods
to and through the Plaintiff to residents of the
state of Utah within the meaning of Utah's "longarm" statute, section 78-27-24(2) (supp. 1969);
THIRD, that the defendant's substantial business
contacts with the state of Utah warrent the assertion
of jurisdiction under common law standards; FOURTH,
the defendant, by and through its' attorney, by stipulation, agreed that an amended complaint could be
filed in this action, and that service of process
by registered mail to defendant's attorney was sufficient
and good service of the defendant.
The defendant contends that it was not transacting business in this state, either within the
meaning of the "long-arm" statute or under common
law jurisdictional standards, and further contends
that it did not have sufficient minimum contacts
with the state of Utah to permit a constitutional
assertion of jurisdiction by Utah courts, and that

several grounds: FIRST, the defendant's negotiations
in the state of Utah with the plaintiff (and its
predecessor in interest, Sports Industries, Inc.,)
in December of 1973 and January resulting in a
contract constitute a transaction of business in
the state of Utah within the meaning of Utah's "longarm" statute, section 78-27-24 (1) (supp. 1969t);
SECOND, the defendant contracted to supply goods
to and through the Plaintiff to residents of the
state of Utah within the meaning of Utahfs "longarm" statute, section 78-27-24(2) (supp. 1969);
THIRD, that the defendant's substantial business
contacts with the state of Utah warrent the assertion
of jurisdiction under common law standards; FOURTH,
the defendant, by and through its' attorney, by stipulation, agreed that an amended complaint could be
filed in this action, and that service of process
by registered mail to defendant's attorney was sufficient
and good service of the defendant.
The defendant contends that it was not transacting business in this state, either within the
meaning of the "long-arm" statute or under common
law jurisdictional standards, and further contends
that it did not have sufficient minimum contacts
with the state of Utah to permit a constitutional
assertion of jurisdiction by Utah courts, and that

the service of summons was not sufficient.
The defendant's positions, however, are untenable for numerous reasons.

There are numerous

undisputed facts which clearly show that the defendant was transacting business within the meaning
of the U.C.A. 78-24-24(1). Arthur Eizenberg, the
general manager of the defendant corporation, admits
he made four business trips to Utah to transact
business related to plaintiff's cause of action.
Mr. Eizenberg's affidavit says that during the trip
of December 28, 1973, he held discussions with
Brent Hall concerning the finalization of the
agreement which is the subject of this lawsuit.
(Eizenberg Aff. R23, Line 4)

The agreement was

not finalized as a result of that trip and Mr.
Eizenberg again returned to Utah on January 4, 1974,
to conduct further negotiations.

On January 5,

1974, plaintiff's predecessor in interest, Sports
Industries, Inc., and the defendant had reached
an agreement, and reduced the agreement of the
parties to writing.

(Hall Aff. R66; Wood Aff. R98;

Jolley Aff. RIOlj Tarran Aff. R107)
The agreement reached by the parties was based
principally upon a proposed contract which had been
prepared by the lawyers of the Defendant's parent
corporation, Union Corporation of Verona, Pennsylvania.

The agreement briefly summarized provided, among
other things, that the defendant would design and
manufacture a plastic ski boot to be marketed by
Sports Industries, Inc.; the defendant specifically
warrented that as of July 1, 1974, they could produce
sufficient quantitites to meet the required sales
volumes indicated in the contract; that Sports Industries
was to make advance payments to Union Plastics for
the boots that it was to produce; that Sports
Industries was to be the exclusive distributors
of the boot to be manufactured by the defendant;
if plaintiff's sales of the ski boot would "yield
to Union . . . minimum revenues" of $600,000.00
for the year 1974, and increasing thereafter to
a "minimum annual gross to Union of $2,000,000.00
by 1978."
Pursuant to the agreement, plaintiff (Sports
Industries, Inc.,) by a check dated January 5,
1974, paid defendant $25,000.00. (Jolley Aff. R100
9T 13)

The defendant shortly thereafter negotiated

the said instrument, (copy of check R99)
The defendant contends that the contract was
never executed in Utah, but does, as noted above,
admit that it was partially negotiated in Utah.
(Eizenberg Aff. R23 Line 4) All future amendments
to the contract continued to show January 5, 1974,

as the effective date of the contract.

In February

of 1974, Sports Industries principals formed the
plaintiff corporation and assigned the contract
to it. The defendant has never denied the existance
of the contract; their only denial has been that
the contract was not signed on January 5, 1974.
It is clear that the parties considered January
5 as the effective date of the contract since both
parties commenced performance immediately. As a
result of the distributorship contract, plaintiff
held a "kick-off" sales meeting on January 11, 1974,
at Provo, Utah.

In furtherance of the January 5th

agreement, defendant's general manager, Arthur
Eizenberg, attended that sales meeting and was the
featured speaker.

(Eizenberg Aff. R23, Aff. R100;

Scmidt Aff. R21, Hall Aff. R114; Tarran Aff. R107;
Jensen Aff. R103)

The sales efforts of the plaintiff

were very successfulf and by April 30, 197 4, the
general manager of the defendant was able to report
in writing to the parent company the following:
To date we have orders (from the plaintiff) for approximately 10,000 pair, or
approximately $218,000.00 These orders
represent trial quantities only, and in
many cases are dependent upon the customer's
approval of the first shipment, or pair of
"production" boots that can be tried
on. This represents a tremendous acceptance
of a new, untried product. (Eizenberg Letter
Rill)

The undisputed facts also clearly show that
the defendant contracted to supply goods in the
state of Utah as contemplated by Section 78-27-24(2).
The defendant entered into a contract while
in Utah to supply goods and services exclusively
to plaintiff in Utah.

Plaintiff has alleged that

its claim arises from defendant's failure to supply
the goods.

By April 2 0, 1974, the defendant had

already received orders for approximately $218,000.00
worth of ski boots. (Eizenberg Letter Rill)

The

January 5, 1974, agreement provided that the sales
would be recorded in the name of the plaintiff with
delivery directly to plaintiffs customers.
The defendant attempts to explain away these
sales to plaintiff and its customers by stating
that the contract provides for FOB Los Angeles.
Various courts, in construing the "long-arm" statute,
have held that the FOB point is immaterial when
considering whether or not a party has in fact
contracted to supply services or goods to a resident
of a particular state.

It is undisputed that the

defendant accepted orders from the plaintiff for
goods sold to the plaintiff to be shipped to the
plaintiff sole office and outlet and to other Utah
retail outlets.
Defendant's trip to Utah on December 28, 197 3,

was to conduct, face to face negotiations for the
sale of its goods to the plaintiff in Utah. On
January 5, 1974, while in Utah, defendant's general
manager entered into a contract to supply plaintiff
goods.

The defendant accepted plaintiff's money

and money orders pursuant to that contract.

The

defendant had to contemplate that many of the,ski
boots would be shipped to Utah directly from defendant's plant.
The defendant appears to be arguing that all of
tests for the statutory "transacting business" and
the test for "doing business" in Utah are the same.
Such is not the case.

Under the Utah "long-arm"

statute the transaction of business does not necessitate a showing that a foreign corporation is in
fact doing business in Utah under the traditional
common law tests of doing business.

The uniform

"long-arm" statute, which Utah has adopted, codifies
the Supreme Court approved doctrine that certain
acts of a individual or foreign corporation will
subject that person or corporation to the jurisdiction of local courts to defend claims based upon
those activities regardless of what other business acts or activites the non-resident or foreign
corporation may or may not have transacted within
the state.

The transaction of business, in the "longarm" statute is clear and unambiguous for it defines
any act "affecting" persons or businesses in this
state as an act of transacting business. Under
this definitionf a plaintiff need show only a claim
arising from a form-related act which involves
persons or businesses in this state. The defendant
never has, nor can he deny, that his negotiations
and contracting with the plaintiff in this state
have obviously affected the plaintiff and that
its Utah negotiated contract is the basis of this
action.
Even if the District Court does not have jurisdiction over the defendant under the "long-arm"
statute, the courts of Utah do have jurisdiction
under the traditional doing business concept. The
undisputed contacts of the defendant are substantial
enough to meet the guidelines laid down in Hill
v. Zale Corporation, 25U.2d357,482 P.2d 332.
While it may be true that the defendant does
not physically have any local offices, stores, or
outlets independent of the plaintiff, the plaintiff certainly acted as an outlet in Utah for defendant 's goods.

The defendant categorized the

plaintiff as its "exclusive sales and merchandising
operation" for its boots.

Plaintiff's Utah (and

only office was defendant's sole national outlet.
(Eizenberg Letter paragraph IV R110)

Any skier

desiring to purchase defendant's ski boots were
required to purchase the same through the plaintiff,
whose sole place of business was located at Provo,
Utah.
Second, the defendant does not deny it hired,
fired, and paid Utah residents to perform work in
Utah in the production of the ski boots.

The defend-

ant hired the services of Mr. Wight of Salt Lake
City, and, according to Mr. Eizenberg's affidavit,
he personally came to Utah to review Mr. Wight's
progress. (Eizenberg Aff. R 23, 24, 25)

The defendant

had the sole supervision of Mr. Wight and became
dissatisfied with his work and discharged him.
The defendant then requested the plaintiff's help
in locating another artisan to complete the work
commenced by Mr. Wight. Mr. Hall located an artisan
by the name of Frank Riggs of Alpine, Utah.
Riggs discussed the nature of the project by
phone with Mr, Eizenberg and agreed to work on the
project at an hourly rate of $10.00 per hour. Mr.
Riggs received models of the boots from the defendant
and all direction on the prject came from the defendant. All problems and questions were directed to
the defendant.

Mr. Eizenberg flew to Utah and

reviewed Mr. Riggs' work.

(Eizenberg Aff. R 23,

24)

Mr. Riggs received several pay checks from

the defendant's parent corporation, namely Union
Corporation of Verona, Pennsylvania, for the work
performed for the defendant on an hourly basis.
(Riggs Aff. R 96; copy of one Paycheck stub R 93)
Contrary to defendant's claims, the defendant
did advertise in the state of Utah by several methods.
These advertising efforts were part of a preconceived
plan on the part of the defendant to advertise its
own company name directly and also indirectly through
the plaintiff.

The defendant, almost from the begin-

ing, insisted that the plaintiff insure that the
name "UNION" be constantly "put before the buying
public."

(R110)

The name of the plaintiff. Union

Ski Company, was chosen because the defendant insisted that the name "Union" be broadly advertised
and used by the plaintiff whenever and wherever
possible.
The defendant further sought to advertise its
company and its parent company in Utah, and throughout the nation, by furnishing literature and stock
holders' reports to the plaintiff, to be distributed
with the literature of the plaintiff to help generate
sales of the ski boot.

The said literature of the

defendant was, in fact, distributed both nationally
at trade shows and locally in Utah, and used in
obtaining orders for defendants ski boots.

To

further advertise the defendant's involvement in
the sale of the ski boots, defendant's General
Manager personally distributed literature about
defendant at plaintiff's sales booths at trade shows
in Bostonf Chicago, and Las Vegas.

The defendant

provided information and photographs of defendant's
plant and equipment to be used by the plaintiff
in its sales literature.

That literature was mailed

to Utah ski boot customers.
The defendant consistently requested that the
plaintiff advertise the defendant as the manufacturer
of the ski boot.

This reason became apparent when

Mr. Eizenberg gave Mr. Hall a copy of a letter
between Mr. Eizenberg and his superior, Mr. Haden.
The last sentence of page 3 of that letter states:
"If they [Union Ski Company] do not meet
the goals in our contract, we [Union
Plastics Corporation] are free to market
OUR product in any way we see fit. Meanwhile the UNION name has been put before
the buying public." [emphasis in original
text]
Defendant's activities within the state meet
the fourth

guideline set forth in Hill v. Zale,

in that the defendant has had, and still has, personal property within the state of Utah and negotiate
banking arrangements in the State of Utah.

The

defendant shipped samples to the sculpturer, Mr.
Riggs, and to the plaintiff.

(copy of shipping

bills at R 91, 92)

Some of the initial

sculpture

work and various model designs belonging to the
defendant are still located in Utah.
On one of Mr. Eizenberg's trips to Utah, he*
and the principal officers of the plaintiff met
with a Mr. Douglas Black of Tracy-Collins Bank and .
Trust Company in Salt Lake City.

In that meeting

with Mr. Black, it was determined that a special
account would be set up at Tracy-Collins Bank and
Trust Company, in the name of the defendant and
the plaintiff.

Customers would pay their invoices

directly to that Utah bank account.

No account

was actually opened that day in the name of the
defendant since it would not be needed until shipments commenced.

Because defendant never manufactured

any ski boots, shipments were never commenced.
Defendant does not deny the meeting but only denies
that an account was opened.
Defendant's activities within the state of
Utah were continuous and systematic and not sporadic
or transitory.

Defendant's management at the highest

levels of the corporation visited Utah as often
as

they deemed necessary to secure sales, to review

production, to participate in sales meetings of
the plaintiff, to negotiate with a bank, to review
plaintiff's obligations under the contract.

While

the visits may have been of short duration, the
"activities" generated therby were continuous and
systematic.

Models were shipped to Utah, phone

calls and letters on numerous occasions were exchanged,
and artisans were working regularly under the direction
of the defendant, all as a result of defendant's
activities within the state.

(Schmidt Aff. R21,

Eizenberg Aff. R23; Kinder Aff. R28).
The sixth guideline set down by Hill v. Zale,
supra, is fully met in the instant case.

The vast

majority of alleged facts of the asserted claim
arose from activities within the state of Utah.
Most of the negotiations and the January 5th contract were consummated in Utah.

Most of the per-

formance required by both the plaintiff and the
defendant were generated from activities within
the state of Utah.

The damages to plaintiff result-

ing from the defendant's failure to manufacture
any boots and fill any of plaintiff's orders, lies
within the state of Utah.
The seventh guideline, that

of relative hard-

ship or convenience, is clear in the case at bar.
The plaintiff has become insolvent as a result of
the defendant's failure to fill its orders for plaintiff's sole product.

Likewise, the officers of

plaintiff are experiencing personal financial hard-

ship as a result of corporate loans that they guaranteed in furtherance of the contract between the
parties.

The plaintiff is totally without funds

to effectively pursue this litigation outside of
Utah. (Jolly Aff. R51)

The defendant, on the other

hand, is a company whose sales total in the millions
of dollars and who has assets and resources far
i

beyond those of the plaintiff.

Furthermore, the

current defendant, Union Plastics Corporation of
California, is a subsidiary of the Union Corporation,
a large corporate conglomerate who has heretofore
financed the project.

(R93) The resources and assets

of the parent company number in the of millions
of dollars.

Certainly the defendant has the finan-

cial ability to defend this litigation within the
State of Utah.

ARGUMENT

I
DEFENDANT VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED ITSELF TO IN
PERSONAM JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF THE STATE
OF UTAH
At the time this action was by plaintiff's
service of summons commenced,

the parties were

engaged in settlement negotiations.

In order to

enhance the prospects of a settlement, plaintiff
stipulated that it would not require defendant to
file an answer until 20 days after service on defendant's attorney of a written notice demanding the
answer.

In return for plaintiff's granting the

extension of time to answer, defendant stipulated
and agreed that it would accept and be bound by
service of the demand upon its attorney.

The simple

complaint actually filed was the agreed method
for plaintiff to preserve its service of process
with the understanding that the complaint would
be amended if negotiations failed.

Defendant thus

further stipulated that plaintiff could file an
amended complaint without leave of court, and that
such amended complaint would be acknowledged and
accepted if served upon defendant's attorney.

It

is universally acknowledged that in personam jurisdiction can be conveyed by consent of the defendant.
Re-statement 2d of Conflict of Laws, section 32
(1971).

Through the stipulation of the parties,

and in exchange for the privilege

of not being

required to respond to plaintiff's pleadings, pending
the outcome of the settlement negotiations, defendant
agreed to have plaintiff's pleadings served upon
its attorney, and thereby submitted itself to the
jurisdiction of the courts of this state.
II.
THE COURTS OF UTAH CLEARLY HAVE THE CONSTITUTIONAL
POWER TO ASSERT JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE UNDER
APPLICABLE U.S. SUPREME COURT DUE PROCESS CASES.
As this court is already well-versed in the
history of iri personam jurisdiction since Pennoyer
vs. Neff, 95 US 714 (1877), it is unnecessary to
trace in detail that development.

A brief summary

of the present standards established by the Supreme
Court will suffice.

The pivotal case in the evolution

of in. personam jurisdiction is, of course, International Shoe vs. Washington, 326 US 310 (1945),
wherein the Supreme Court abandoned the old concepts
of "power," "implied consent," "constructive presence," and "doing business" in favor of the new
"minimum contacts" standard.

The court stated the

test as follows:
Due process requires only that in order to
subject a defendant to a judgment in. personam,
if he be not present within the territory of
the forum, he will have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of
the suit does not offend traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.
This constitutional standard was further expanded
by the court in subsequent cases.

In McGee vs.

International Life Insurance Company, 335 US 220
(1957), the Supreme Court upheld California's assertion of jurisdiction over a Texas corporation
holding:
It is sufficient for purposes of due process
that the suit was based on a contract which
had substantial connection with the state....
The extant of the defendant's contact with the state
of California in McGee was a single life insurance
contract between defendant and plaintiff, a resident
of California.

The defendant had no office or agent

in California, and apart from the contract involved
in the litigation, had never transacted any business
in California.

A reinsurance certificate offering

to insure the plaintiff in accordance with specified
terms was mailed to plaintiff in California.

The

plaintiff accepted the offer and paid the premiums
by mail from California.
isolated contract with

Thus, under McGee, an

a resident of the forum

state satisfied the requirements of due process,

even though a] ] contact and correspondence

was

through t,J:i( • ma i ] ,
The next year the court reiterated the mini mum contacts r cqui rcniont and added <i I in 1 her

cHidan-

ationi
It is essential in each case that there be
some act by which the defendant purposely avails
itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum state. Hansen v s . Denckla
357 US 235 (1958).
The essence of the holding

'• n Hansen is that the

minimum contacts, or due process requirement/
not be met merely by uni ntentional and

can-

unforseeable

c o n t a c t w :i t: 1 I t. h e f o i: i i m s t a t e.
In ligl it of the controlli ng Supreme

Court

authorities and the facts of th is case, Union Plast :i c s ' h a s u n q u e s t i o n a b 1 y 1 I a d s u f f i c i e n t c o n t a c t w i t h •
this state to permit tl le Utah courts to assert jurisdJ " ! .

-

•

of the Federal Constitution .

>C* . -. '* . ..

D e f e n d a n t 1 ^ contacts

w i t h plaintiff - • the state* m
not

-

* KI V;->C certainly

'

the defendant availed itseii o; t h 1 privilege *;4
w o r k i n g and d e a l i n g w i t h a Utal I corporation for
the express purpose of fur tl ier:i i ig i ts manufacturing
activities through a Utah o u t l e t .
as clear

It is equally

under McGee 11 iat a contract requi ring

a Utah c o r p o r a t i o n ,

w:i th

its

S( )le

P:l ace of

business

' h
defendant t h e first year

the s e c o n d y e a r , i las " s u b s t a n t
the s t a t e of Utal i,

%:t\A.

iii.j :?

> 1 -onrv- c t i on , ! v * th

i \ coir ,;

this c a s e w i t h t h e n a t u r e a n d e x t e n t -.-: t:m c o n t a c t s
he] d siiffi c:i e n t J :)y 11 ie Suprerne C o 1 i:i ,

i uLurnatiom..-

Shoe and McGee can lead only to the conclusion
that the constitutional "mini m u m c o n t a c t s " test
h a s b e e i 1 s a t i s f i e d :i i i t 1 :i i s c a s e.

111
J URISDICTION UNDER THE UTAH ".LONG-ARM" STATUTE IS
CO-EXTENSIVE WITH THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREM E N T S O F Di: JE P R O C E S S A N D SHOT JI .E BE A PPI JED TC • T H I S
CASE.
Following iho pronouncement Coiir i. <>l i I

w .

,, ;•> I I b e r a 1

tv s u reme

(; u % . * ,'...:. .

s t a n d a r d for in. p e r s o n a m j u r i s d i c t i o n , most s t a t e s ,
including Utah, adopted the Uniform,

Inter-state

and I n t e r n a t i o n a l P r o c e d u r e A c t , common1y
as t h e "long-arm" s t a t u t e .

known

This u n i f o r m a c t w a s

d e s i gne d t o e x t en d 11 i e j \ 11: i s d i c t :i o i I :> f s t a t e c o u r t; s
over non-resident defendants to the maximum extent
permissible under the ,1 4th Amendmer *
I:c: ] ea V«E i a n y doi ii )t

Not wanting

a s 1 ::<:> til le ] < =g*.. -. ..Live p u r p o s e

or the scope o f in p e r s o n a m j u r i s d i c t i o n i i i this

st .it I' ,. I hi*

1 e q i s T nt l i r e

in ov i ijod

I he

f*« »1 It iw I i i " |

preamble to the statute:
It Is declared; as a matter of legislative
determination, that the public interest demands that the state provide its citizens with
an effective means of redress against non-resident persons, wl 10 through certain significant
minimal contacts with this state, incur obligations to citizens entitled to the state's
protection. This legislative action is deemed
necessary because of technological progress
which has substantially increased the flow
of commerce between the several states resulting
in increased interaction between persons of
thi s state and persons of other states.
The provisions of this act, to insure maximum
protection to citizens of this state, should
be applied so as to assert jurisdiction over
non-resident defendants to the fullest extent
permitted by the due process clause of the
14th Amendment to the United States Const!tnitioit.
U.C.A. 78-27-22 (supp. 1969
1

I

.i ! :i iitp] e m e n t d i lg t h e pi lrpose of tl le

statute the legislature enumerated specific acts
upon whicl i "long-arm,11 juri sdiction may be based,
p i: o v i d i i i g i i i p e i: 1: :! i I e i I !: j: • a i: 1 1

: .

Any person, notwithstanding section 16-10-102,
whether or not a citizen or resident of this
state, who in person or through an agent does
any of the following enumerated acts, submits
himself, and if an individual, his personal
representative, to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state as to any claim arising'
from:
] , The transaction of any business within
this state; 2. Contracting to supply
services or goods in this state; , . .
Consistent with the mandate that jurisdiction be
asserted over non-residents to 1 :he fu1 1 est exten.t
p e r m i t t e d b;y the Federal Consti I: iiiti oi i i s t h e d e l : i n i -

i •

w i t h j a ifti -

t.citt

iess

-u* - s e c t i o n c

.

3-

27-2 3 defines the phrase as fol ] owsi
The words "transaction of business within
this state" mean activities of a non-resident
person, h i s agents, or representatives in this
state which affect persons o r businesses within
the state of Utah,
It i s clear from the expression
and from the formulation
dvv

of legislative

intent

and language of the rema in-

of I In1 "ill -il ult1 t li.ii I lii1, sidle hii'. 3 egi slati ely

abandoned tne o l n concept: , , .i
p r e s e n c e , " "implied consent,

!

..

*
; i!

^ ,nbtracti\e

J \ ; business"

whi cl i ve n. ,,.•-•'•.;
t a c t s w i t h t h e lir-rum s t a t e .J:; I . J c
mi i i i mum

-1'* . •' -•

i

adopted t h e

Cdiiadiu e n u n u i d c e d by Liit; United

S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t .
The d e f e n d a n t has suggested a n d it is p o s s i b l e

void :,' any explanation \->i: it. i....]:uij that r. .
Utah "long-arm" statu*-*- should not apply - t:-u

Pi lintiff c o n t e n d s tiia- it. a^eci
ar

"oecific l a n g u a g e .

;o' .,c plead ,:

A s already stated, it w a s

agreed b e t w e e n the p a r t i e s t -.at „i.., .tiff would
file a simple o n e page complaisei vi ce of si lmmoi is ,- t i lat I: tic
have t o answer t h e complaint

-23-

r..« preserve, it-

*> -r. >i
a:.*il

i" i n n e r

notice

and that plaintiff would be allowed to expand and
replead its causes ot -u-io:: 1/

imendment.. , 1^4

Pia1111i f:f t. i',11,1s

'ixcn b i n l

exists to set forth - u: c a u ^
theories includlnq

ink : i n

appropriate

urisdictiona i fact-- , etc*

Plaintiff's demand ^ r an answ

<y

complaint came when negotiations ceased.
comi

i

Plaintiff

•'•!!:. 'plaint but received

defendant'_• motions L„ quash ai .: (usmiss before
the amendments were filed• Plaintiff is unable to
determine from the disLii.'l .:r*. 11 t.. ioeisi'ii »dhd her
the "long-arm" statute was even considered.
p.l eadi I;-J/

The

< ley stand should be construed to

include a 1 .. theories of j urisdiction in 11 <j111*. o f
the stipulation between the parties for amending the
complaint.
V
DEFENDANT'S ACTIVITIES BRING IT WELL WITHIN THE
SCOPE OF THE UTAH "LONG-ARM" STATUTE

BASED ON THE

UNDISPUTED FACTS THAT AN EXCELIS IVK SALES AN)) MERCHANDIZING DISTRIBUTORSHIP CONTRACT WAS NEGOTIATED
IN UTAH AND GOODS WERE CONTRACTUALLY SOLD IN I JT£ H
In the instant case only two requirements under
the Utah

f:

1 ^ng-arm1' statute must be met to assert

jurisdict 1 » *

1

**- ^ 1

1, Union Plastics must have either (A)
been involved in activities in this state
which affected persons or businesses within
the state, which is "the transaction of
business, or (B) "contracted to supply services
or goods to a person or business in this s t a t e / 1
and
2.

Plaintiff's

claim

liiiisl

.trisi1

trrmi

raieh

activities.
I.I

i i:i 11 o I d e r 11 e d

I: h a1

1Jl "I, a i. n 1; i. f I * •• \ i" „1 a i ni r i r i s e s

f i" < > n i

the activities related to or based upon the contract
dated January '5, 1 9 7 4 ,
is whethe:
i'

The ori.b, question, therefore,

- -n Plastics activities can be cone l iiutcJI

• 'it- transaction t.\ business within this state,
•• :

this statt.

have applied the

not

in

may have ruled.

- i ch this coui t and other courts
:

~ .xt

that this questio
and

sei: vi ees or goods in

- comparisoi I of tl le facts in this case

with other cases .

ti ve

'

the

D U answerec

.. :.^. :v^

^IIKL

\:H_

a;*

.-L.ii

th-r

•;

:

is

:* the affirma*:r" i\

COUIL

"tatute , s a uniform

act adopted by-many other states, the construction
of tl le ac t: b} bhe coi lr ts Df atl ler states i s a ] so
relevant,

It should also be noted that the statute

has been upheld against

const r .it:io;iai attacks ;n

states across tl le

. • •• >

in Utal i so as to O/it na jurisdiction ?

t^e fuj'.^st

extent permitted I:

* •-

:*>nsH« ^-.ion.

F i r s t f cases applying the "transaction of business"

provisions of the statute wllJ 1: >e compared with
the present case.

Foreign Study League vs. Holland-

America L i n e , 27 Utah 2d 442 49 7 P 2d'244

(1972),

has so many factual similarities with the present
case t hat" t -let/d i 1 o«l n'ye»u el "'lie 1 acts is warranted.
The plaintiff was a Utah corporation which chartered
ships to foreign lands for eu
The defendant .» > a foreign corporation with offices
in Rotterdam, :J<_W Y O I /. ,

r .

Angeles, * " other ports.

*-

area of charter service*or offices nn^ ;

defendant

.-i i*r-^o:

,*.

- )i es

r personnel ±n utdii.

The on] y outlet, or contact, of defendant with the
state was through travel agencies authorized
book its services.

' •*

..••••

ant's representatives .^-i LuiL.-

..A .• ;.-* J re. : i J"

Utah ie, encourage i* fu yej L defendant's space on
(

a i
and

_•".- state ei utan

• . •• • -,i d'.: iendant

relied ue^rj ie .plaintiff * J

jurisdiction over the person oi defendant, and of
t:..

-

• litiqati on arose were

related to a;: attempt * > • * * .
chartei

J r • ee

lie;-*-., -i'-y v-i*-. *
h% - e L

m

agreement to

. '.^nidtions 1 < « >k j: LI a c e i i I Sa ] 1
> v-'.v Ynv-v

There was correspondence

telegram, and telephone 'between the
• -

•

W u ,i S t M i l ,

I i.) | f 1 a i n I in I I

.

in Salt Lake City, but it was n \
factory and defendant sent an a-,.- = .r. •<: Sd.i liuKt
City to "confer wi th plaintiff's officers re, a
fl •

te en in i sunders t ami i IKJ . J, In I In njnl I'licl ' '

The contract was sent back to defendant unsigned*
iclear

the contract was not signed, I Hit:
j.-.ck was sent to defendant i.n con-

nection with the negotiations.
J

tint
acfrii

business n.

Based on these facts,
»fi" e n (J a n!;, 11. J I 1 t r. 1111»-™

i-x.^u under ti. » letter arid spirit

of International Shoe, Hill vs. Zjale^ an earlier
opinion of this court, <md the IHVJI'I "long-arm"
statute.

The court; added that I:he plaintiff's case

was further strengthened

J--

-is

whi ch defendant had *• ••-i in io..;.ia travel agents.

it

was also implied in • * = » ,;;.;ar*d. op.rii.on that the
(i)l a] n f i H:'' s * '-I 'ic* v." »"

;••:••-

the agency agreements nud been

:

-,,'--. «• . , f

xciusive agreements,

imposing a higher degree of conl rol over the agents.
Mr

3 list ice Crockett, win » d i s sen ted , i IKHeated he

may have concurred ii I the majority opinion had there
been a valid contract between plaintiff
ant,
case,

AIL oi these factors are preserv
That then

Defei : t

w1

.;. IA^

instant

was a con tra*..d is -•:>: disputed.

- - 'r

.

* * ?

-

sive sales and merchandizing operation,"

lu-

Under

t h e terms o i u ' -

^ ••'•• i.i,

SUCh

J.

as

minimm

.

extremely t i ght c o n t r o l s ,

i . ;;,i.

IKMIllS,

ill'i1

llllpOSOtj

on p l a i n t i f f .
In ci'ini.T'-'^it t.u l''oreigr^ Stiid^ L e a g u e v s . H o l l a n d America Line is Mack Financial Corporation vs.
Nevada Motor Rentals,.Incorporated, a case recently .
d e c i d e d b y t h i s c o i 11: t < J, r n 1 a p p a r o u t J.)" i: € 1 i e
by the tri a] court i i 1 tl le present case.

Mack Financial

Corporation is clearly distinguishable on the facts
from the present case.

Nevada Motor Rentals, a

foreign corporation, purchased trucks In Denver,
Co.] or ado,

on: i ::: Dndd t: i onaJ sal es contracts from f lack

Trucks, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Mack Trucks
assigned its interest I n the sales contracts to
MacK Financial

,

r.

:,

f

u, business *
4

• :-

, s ^ ^

. tl

Nevada encountered dif-

i'i.' • *v uents a n a a r r a n g e d t* M . ^

the trucks and im.
ness entity-

*

contracts over to an Idaho busi-

.) inco the contracts forbade an assign-

rv * * _ * .
assignee, Nevada sent *• is
consent to an assignment.

!

:t.:) Utah to request

Mack Financial made i ts

owi 1 i nvestigatJ oi i a i id p r e p a r e d ai id si gi led ai i as si gn
m e n t . Nevada's a s s i g n e e d e f a u l t e d o n t h e c o n t r a c t s
ancl a n a c t : L o n w a s

brought

on

Nevada as a party defendant,

the contracts naming
This court correctly

found on these facts that jurisdiction could not
1 >e assei: ted ove. t N e v a d a .

N e v a d a h.iJ *-

Lu s u p p l y a n y t h i n g in U t a h a n d

f

he

did n o t a r i s e o u t o f a n y t r a n s a d it
by N e v a d a :i i 1 tl le s tate

contracted

. i. >;.i.ff 's c l a i m
« • i usiness
i

Nevac

state of Utah was requesting Financial
l.iintiff1

to an assignment and the
arise out of this act.

l

"•

.

.1

; consent
' < u n did rmt
.j T o contend

that Mack Financial Corporation controls the present
case.
The California "long-arm" statute construed
in Buckeye Boiler Company vs, Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, 8 0 < -,_ .-::>.:*- •--..•]

*

57 (1969), provided, as does the Utah statute,
th.it jurisdiction was to be extended as far as p e r m i s sible under the 14th Amendment,

The exact statutory

language in issue was "doing business, 1 1

The California

Supreme Coin: I: coi istr i led tl: le sta t i ite to mean that
there must be economic activity

m

uhe part of the

defendant in the forum state, -J I i.in!- t :\o cause
o f a c t i o n m u s t a ::i: i s e o i 11 o f
defendant's forum related activity,

,•

\i

The defendant,

B u c k e y e , had no agent, office, sales representative,
exclusive agency or exclusive sales outlet, w a r e h o u s e ,
stock of

merchandise, property, or bank account

i i I CaJ iforn :i a

I t: cl :i ::i i lot s 3J ] oi l c ::::)! isi gnment b ::::::),.

-* ;\i

and, had i 10 • ::::oiiiiri,.:i ssi 01 1 agreemei i t: '"
or e n t i t y it1 C a l i f o r n i a .

However, : ; J period

of five years prior 10 plaintiff's injury, the
defendant had sold nrp.ssnre tanks to Cochin Manufacturing Company,

v

' M o <orporatioi , w.,ioh ; i <

tdi ! lit'(] ,i in.inii I fir i u i i n « j | -1 m i i i inn
Cochin ordered some tanks directly from that p,lant
and purchased others throun

plan

Francisco

ranged from $25,000,

if

JIM-M
l

Oh i ; office.

iros-, sales f. , .chin
JU.UU,

Other

!n

i

the sales to Cochin, Buckeye had no contact with
anyone i n the state of Californi a.

Nevertheless,

the Cour t: 1 ie] d :
A manufacturer engages in economic activity
within a state as a matter of commercial actuality whenever the purchase or use of its
product within the state generates gross income for the manufacturer and is not so fortuitous or unforseeable as to negative the
existence of an intent on the manufacturer's
part to bring about this result. . « •
In the present case f it is clear that defendant
derives substantial economic benefit from the
sale and use of its products in California;
it currently derives about $30,000.00 annually
in gross sales revenues from its direct sales
of certain pressure tanks to the Cochin Manufacturing Company plant in South San Francisco.
On the basis of these sales alone, defendant
is purposely engaging in economic activity
within California as a matter of commercial
actuality.
That Union Plastics products were purchased
i i l "I J t a 1 i b y I J i l i o i i S k i , g e n e i: a t i i i g g i: o s s :i i i c o in e t o

Plastics, can in no way be considered fortuitous
or unforseeable.

Such economic activity by Plastics

in Utah was the object of the contract calling for
a continuous economic activity in Utah amounting
to millions of dollars.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals explained
the meaning and proper application of the term
"transaction of business within this state" in Doyn
Aircraft/ Inc. vs. Wylie, 443 F. 2d 579, Tenth
Circuit, (1971), a case factually very similar to
the present case.

The Court held:

In a broad sense business is transacted within the state when an individual is within or
enters this state in person or by agent and
through dealing with another within this state,
effectuates or attempts to effectuate a purpose
to improve his economic conditions and satisfy
his desires.
The Court further held that acts of negotiating
a contract were business transactions in the sense
that the defendant "was trying to effectuate a purpose to improve his economic conditions and satisfy
his desires, and that in so doing he purposely
availed himself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum state."

See also Hunter

Hayes Elevator Co. V. Petroleum Club Inn 419 P.
2d 465 (1966) where the New Mexico State Supreme
Court upheld jurisdiction where the only contact
with New Mexico was preliminary negotiation of a

contract.
The Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit,
affirmed a decision of the Federal District Court
in Illinois, upholding jurisdiction over an English
corporation under the Illinois "long-arm" statute,
which is word for word the same as the Utah statute.
The Court held:
i

A defendant who sends an agent into Illinois
to solicit or to negotiate a contract is transacting business within the statutory definition.
The fact that some of the important pre-contract
negotiations were conducted elsewhere than
Illinois and that the actual execution of the
contract occurred outside of Illinois' borders
is immaterial. Scovill Manufacturing Company
vs. Dateline Electric Company, 461 F. 2d 897"
7th Circuit, 1972)
11

Long-arm" jurisdiction was asserted over Utah

residents Who secured a bank loan in Colorado by
the courts of that state under the Colorado "longarm" statute, which is also identical to the Utah
statute.

The issue and holding in that case were

stated by the Court as follows:
So, the precise question to be resolved, then,
is whether the bank's cause of action does,
or does not, "arise from" the transaction by
the petitioners of "any business" within the
state of Colorado. We hold that the bank's
claim does arise from the transaction of "any
business11 by the two petitioners within this
state, and that under the circumstances the
service of process was quite properly upheld
by the trial court.
It seems evident to us that the petitioners
most certainly did transact business within

this state. To illustrate, petitioners, and
each of them, voluntarily left their place
of residents in Utah and made the long journey
to Adams County in Colorado. There they very
successfully negotiated a loan of $30,000.00
from the bank. At this same time and place,
the petitioners, in return for this loan, executed and delivered to the bank their promissory note in the principal amount of $30,000.00.
Surely, it cannot be seriously denied that
the petitioners, physically present within
the state, did transact business—and about
$30,000.00 worth of business—within this state.
Knight vs. District Court of Seventeenth i
Judicial District, County of Adams, 424 P 2d
110 Colorado (1967).
Oregon has also adopted precisely the same
"long-arm" statute as Utah.

In State, ex rel.

White Lumber Sales, Inc. vs. Sulmonetti,

448 P

2d 571 Oregon (1968), the Oregon Supreme Court upheld
the assertion of Jurisdiction over a non-resident
on the basis of a single telephone order for a
carload of plywood.

The Court, noting the statutory

definition of "transaction of business" said, "It
is clear that the placing of the telephoned order
had effects, or 'significant contacts,1 in Oregon."
It is even more clear that Plastics1 activities
in this case have had effect on persons and businesses
in Utah.
The holdings of these cases and many more are
represented to some extent in Re-Statement 2d,
Conflict of Laws, section 84, comment at 91.
It is reasonable that a state should have judicial
jurisdiction over any individual as to causes
of action arising from an act done for pecuniary

profit having substantial consequences within
the state even though the act is an isolated
act not constituting the doing of business
within the state.
Certainly, it cannot be denied that the acts of
the defendant in this case were done for pecuniary
profit, nor can it be denied that the consequences
of these acts suffered by plaintiff are subtantial.
In the following three cases, "long-arm" x
statutes containing provisions similar to the Utah
provision for jurisdiction over any person contracting to supply services or goods in the state are
construed and applied.

The following facts were

the basis of jurisdiction in Kornfuehrer vs. Philadelphia Bindery, Inc., 240 F,* supp. 157 (1965).
The plaintiff wrote the

defendant to ask if it

manufactured spring back binders. A series of
letters followed in which the parties discussed
specifications and terms.

For the purposes of the

case it was assumed that in late March the plaintiff
placed an order for 7,500 binders and the defendant
accepted it. A few days later the defendant wrote
the plaintiff, telling him that it had made an error
in its cost estimates and would not be able to produce exactly the type of binder he wanted except at
a substantially higher cost.

The plaintiff replied

that he had already made commitments which prevented
him from allowing the order to be cancelled and he

eventually instituted suit for breach of contract.
The court relied on three legal issues from the
Supreme Court opinion in McGee and found all three
to support jurisdiction in the case.
1. The contract was delivered in the forum
state.
2.

Payment was made from the forum state.

3.

The plaintiff was a resident of the forum.

The court dealt with another of the defendants
arguments as follows:
The shipment was to be FOB Philadelphia and
those shipping terms have served as the basis
for an argument on the part of the bindery
that no part of the contract was to be performed by it in Minnesota.
Actually the argument seems irrelevant. If
the transfer of the binders is not considered
a part of the defendant's performance, then it
is part of the plaintiff's. Any realistic
treatment of the transaction must view the
carrier bringing the shipment as the agent of
one or both of the parties• As mentioned
earlier, the One-Act statute applies when an
act of either party is to be performed in
Minnesota.
Whether defendant in this case claims it was to ship
ski boots FOB Los Angeles to plaintiff or to plaintiff's
customers under the contract/ the fact remains that the
boots were to be supplied to customers in the state of Utah
since both plainciff and many of plaintiff's customers
are Utah residents.
Defendant has argued that the courts of this
state cannot assert jurisdiction over it because
the contract between plaintiff and defendant was to

be performed outside of the state of Utah*

This

issue was dealt with in Midwest Packaging Corporation
vs. Realikon Plastics, Ltd., 279 F. Supp. 816 (1968).
In response to the same argument made by defendant
in the present case; the court held:
Further, it cannot be denied that the contract
as alleged by plaintiff was to be performed in
whole or in part in Iowa. Plaintiff is any
Iowa corporation with its principal place of
business in Iowa. Therefore, by necessity,
many of the acts required for performance of
the alleged exclusive sales contract would
take place in Iowa. Thus, the defendant has
failed to rebut the prima facie showing by
plaintiff of the existence of such a contaact,
thereby naking the provisions of section 617.3
applicable to the case at bar.
The same result was reached in Clark Advertising
Agency, Inc. vs. Tice, 331 F. Supp. 1058 Northern
District of Texas, 1971. That court held:
The "long-arm" statute clearly applies regardless of which party it is who does the performance in Texas
V
THE DISTRICT COURT HAS JURISDICTION UNDER THE TRADITIONAL
MINIMUM CONTACTS THEORY.
Even if the lower court does not have jurisdiction
over the defendant under 78-27-24, U.C.A. (supp.
1969), the courts of Utah do have jurisdiction over
the defendant under the traditional "minimum contacts"
theory.

This court has recognized the minimum contacts

theory of International Shoe; etc. in recent cases.

be performed outside of the state of Utah*

This

issue was dealt with in Midwest Packaging Corporation
vs. Realikon Plastics, Ltd., 279 F. Supp. 816 (1968).
In response to the same argument made by defendant
in the present case; the court held:
Further, it cannot be denied that the contract
as alleged by plaintiff was to be performed in
whole or in part in Iowa. Plaintiff is any
Iowa corporation with its principal place of
business in Iowa. Therefore, by necessity,
many of the acts required for performance of
the alleged exclusive sales contract would
take place in Iowa. Thus, the defendant has
failed to rebut the prima facie showing by
plaintiff of the existence of such a contaact,
thereby naking the provisions of section 617.3
applicable to the case at bar.
The same result was reached in Clark Advertising
Agency, Inc. vs. Tice, 331 F. Supp. 1058 Northern
District of Texas, 1971. That court held:
The "long-arm" statute clearly applies regardless of which party it is who does the performance in Texas
V
THE DISTRICT COURT HAS JURISDICTION UNDER THE TRADITIONAL
MINIMUM CONTACTS THEORY.
Even if the lower court does not have jurisdiction
over the defendant under 78-27-24, U.C.A. (supp.
1969), the courts of Utah do have jurisdiction over
the defendant under the traditional "minimum contacts"
theory.

This court has recognized the minimum contacts

theory of International Shoe; etc. in recent cases.

While this court set down some guidelines in Hill v.
Zale Corporation No. 12136, Utah Supreme Court, March
9, 1971, each case must be considered on its own
facts within the bounds of justice and fair play.
A careful analysis of defendant's business activities
in the state of Utah are sufficient to assert jurisdiction.
i

Using the guidelines of Mack v. Nevada, Supra
the court apparently failed to consider the following
activities of defendant.

Plaintiff was defendants

sole marketing operation/ in Utah, nationally and
internationally.

Defendant hired, fired and paid

Utah residents on an hourly basis.

This evidences

that part of defendants performance of his obligations
under the contract were performed .in Utah.

Defendant

brought literature about defendant to Utah for distribution to aid in sales. Defendant provided pictures
of defendant's plant for enclusion in sales literature.
Defendant participated in plaintiffs sales meetings
and staffed plaintiff's sales booths.

The defendant

insisted its name UNION be "put before the buying
public". (R110)

Defendant negotiated banking arrange-

ments with a Utah bank.

Defendant's personnel of the

highest level came to Utah several times to review
plaintiff's progress and the progress of their design
work.

Defendant shipped personal property to and from

Utah and still has some here. Most of the contract
actually performed was in Utah.

The contract provided

for sales in the millions of dollars and was to continue
over a period of years. Defendant was paid $25,000.00
in Utah.

Plaintiff's performance in Utah generated

acknoweldged orders for defendant's new boots in
excess of $250,000.00. Defendant's failure to deliver
a single order to plaintiff and its customers turned
plaintiff's performance into a financial nightmare
for plaintiff and its principal officers that personally
guaranteed plaintiffs performance•

Defendant's breach

has resulted in plaintiff being financially unable
to effectively seek relief against defendant outside
of Utah.

In contrast defendant does have the assets

and capital to defend its actions in the State of Utah.
CONCLUSION
In light of the above, the trial court erred
in not finding sufficient minimum contact to sustain
jurisdiction.

There is no due process reason why

defendant, engaging purposefully in all of the above
conduct in Utah, would be treated unfaiirly and unjustly
if the Utah courts required it to defend claims based
on those purposeful acts either under the Utah
"long-arm" statute or under the traditional minimum
contacts theory.

It is also evident that the lower

court erred in interpreting the law and in failing

to consider defendant's total undisputed substantial
business contacts with the State of Utah,

The ruling

below on defendant's motion to dismiss should be
reversed and the lower court be required to assert
jurisdiction.
Respectfully submitted,

i

J. Brent Wood
Counsel for Appelant
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